Juvenile Justice and the Rehabilitative Ideal: A Response to Mr. Stapleton by Stephen Wizner
Yale Review of Law and Social Action
Volume 1
Issue 2 Yale Review of Law and Social Action Article 8
1971
Juvenile Justice and the Rehabilitative Ideal: A
Response to Mr. Stapleton
Stephen Wizner
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yrlsa
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Review of Law and Social Action by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephen Wizner, Juvenile Justice and the Rehabilitative Ideal: A Response to Mr. Stapleton, 1 Yale Rev. L. & Soc. Action (1971).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yrlsa/vol1/iss2/8
82 
Juvenile Justice and the Rehabilitative 
Ideal: A Response to Mr. Stapleton 
by Stephen Wizner 
Stephen Wizner was Connerly managing attorney for Mobili-
zation for Youth Legal Services in New York. He has prac-
ticed extensively in the juvenile courts and is currently a 
clinical instructor at the Yale Law School. 
In the typical juvenile delinquency case, a child is arrested 
by a policeman for the alleged commission of a criminal 
act; taken to a police station where he is interrogated by 
the arresting officer and others who attempt to extract a 
confession from him; brought before a judge; accused of 
committing a crime; prosecuted, and, if found guilty, sen-
tenced to prison or probation. Labeling such a process 
"civil" rather than "criminal," and asserting that its pur-
pose is the rehabilitation rather than the punishment, deter-
rence and incapacitation of offenders, does not alter the 
reality of what happens to the child. A "finding" is aver-
dict, "involved" means guilty, an "act which if done by an 
adult would be a crime" is a crime, a "disposition" is a sen-
tence, and a "training school" is a prison. 
In re Gaultl was a constitutional decision based on the 
Supreme Court's candid recognition of these realities of 
juvenile court proceedings. It was not, as Mr. Stapleton 
implies, a "sociological" decision, nor was it based on any 
empirical studies. Early in the majority opinion, Mr. Justice 
F ortas set the tone for what was to follow: " ... neither the 
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults 
alone."2 The Court cited with approval a statement of a 
former Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court that 
children are entitled to Constitutional protection: 
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" 'In their zeal to care for children neither juvenile judges 
nor welfare workers can be permitted to violate the Consti-
tution, especially the constitutional provisions as to due 
process that are involved in moving a child from its home. 
... [Due process guarantees] must be present if we are to 
treat the child as an individual human being and not to 
revert, in spite of good intentions, to the more primitive 
days when he was treated as a chattel.' " 3 
And again: 
"Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foun-
dation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential 
term in the social compact which defines the rights of the 
individual and delimits the powers which the state may 
exercise. " 4 
Citing its earlier decision in Kent v. United States5 that 
waiver of jurisdiction over a juvenile by a juvenile court to 
an adult criminal court "must measure up to the essentials 
of due process and fair treatment,"6 the Court stated: 
"We reiterate this view, here in connection with a juvenile 
court adjudication of 'delinquency,' as a requirement which 
is part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of our Constitution."? 
And recently, in In re Winship, 8 the Court reaffirmed the 
constitutional basis of its holding in Gault: 
"[T] he Due Process Clause does require application dur-
ing the adjudicatory hearing of 'the essentials of due pro-
cess and fair treatment.' ,,9 
Thus, the Court did not impose due process requirements 
on juvenile court proceedings because it found that juvenile 
crime and recidivism rates demonstrated a failure of the 
juvenile court system, that a juvenile delinquency record is 
stigmatizing, that juveniles perceive informal procedures as 
unfair and that institutionalization is inherently punitive. 
Rather, the Court imposed such requirements because it 
recognized the indisputable form of these proceedings-
children may be deprived of their liberty if they are found 
"guilty." Since this is the case, both in practice and in 
theory, and since children are human beings and not chattel 
or laboratory animals, they are entitled to the protections 
and safeguards conferred upon individuals by the Constitu-
tion against government actions which may deprive them of 
their liberty. "Under our Constitution, the condition of 
being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.'' 1 O 
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The Court's consideration of social science data served 
two purposes. First, it was a response to those who opposed 
the extension of due process rights to juveniles with the 
argument that the unique, humane and benevolent charac-
teristics of the juvenile court system would thereby be un-
dermined. And. second, it was undeniably an attempt to use 
findings of the hehavioral sciences as "window dressing" for 
the decision. The Court emphasized that: 
" ... the features of the juvenile system which its pro-
ponents have asserted arc of unique benefit will not be im-
paired by constitutional domestication. For example, the 
commendable principles relating to the processing and 
treatment of juveniles separately from adults are in no way 
involved or affected by the procedural issues under discus-
sion."11 
And, 
"There is no reason why the application of due process 
requirements should interfere with [provisions classifying 
juvenile offenders as 'delinquents' rather than 'criminals' 
and with preventing an adjudication of delinquency from 
operating as a civil disability.] "12 
"[T]here is no reason why, consistently with due process, a 
state cannot continue, if it deems it appropriate, to provide 
and to improve provision for the confidentiality of records 
of police contacts and court action relating to juveniles." 13 
"While due process requirements will, in some instances, 
introduce a degree of order and regularity to Juvenile Court 
proceedings to determine delinquency, and in contested 
cases will in traduce some elements of the adversary system, 
nothing will require that the conception of the kindly juve-
nile judge be replaced by its opposite .... " 14 
The important point is that even if the Court's conclu-
sions, drawn from the social science data and literature 
which it cited, were unfounded or erroneous, the decision 
in Gault would stand. And it would stand regardless of 
whether the Court were to follow the reasoning of Justice 
Fortas, or of Justices Blackl 5 and Harlanl 6 in their concur-
ring opinions. For in all three approaches, the recognition 
of the essential character of juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings is the crucial element: ~;child may be subjected to the 
deprivation of his liberty if it is established that he has com-
mitted certain acts. 
Stapleton attempts to distinguish juvenile delinquency 
proceedings from criminal proceed in gs by arguing that de-
priving a child of his liberty is not inherently punitive. He 
cites studies demonstrating that for some children, "institu-
tionalization offers a more favorable prognosis than release 
to the community." The Court's decision, however, does 
not rest upon its view of the failure of rehabilitative pro-
grams or upon a judgment that children are better off with 
their families. Stapleton is no doubt correct that institu-
tionalization· is rehabilitative for some children. This asser-
tion is equally true with respect to many children who are 
never brought before a juvenile court. But it is only after a 
finding that a child has committed a specified act that the 
state may invoke rehabilitative programs in his behalf. 
Surely, Stapleton would not advocate the right of the state 
to institutionalize all children for whom "institutionaliza-
tion offers a more favorable prognosis than release to the 
community," whether or not they have committed acts 
which have brought them before the juvenile court. 
Mr. Stapleton's concerns are not confined to the welfare 
and rehabilitation of children accused of juvenile delin-
quency. "[D] oes not the defense attorney," he asks, "have 
some obligation to the broader issue of public safety and 
the protection of the social order by helping to apprehend 
and remove from society those who are a menace to it?" 
The answer to this question is clear: a defense attorney has 
no such obligation. Quite the contrary. The Gault decision 
turned on the similarity between juvenile proceedings and 
adult criminal prosecutions, and the duty of the defense 
attorney is the same in each: to present-as Mr. Stapleton 
notes-"every defense that the law of the land permits."17 
The question posed by Mr. Stapleton is, of course, rhetor-
ical. He feels that a defense lawyer does have an obligation 
to protect the community from his clients, and he claims as 
authority for his position the oft-cited essay of Dean 
Allen.18 A reading of that essay, however, demonstrates 
that Allen· was concerned with the conflicting roles of the 
juvenile court-protection of the child vs. protection of the 
community-and not the role of defense counsel. In fact, 
Allen's position respecting procedural protections for juve-
niles is the opposite of Stapleton's: 
[T] he importance of fair procedures [is] ... readily per-
ceived when it is noted that in many delinquency proceed-
ings the rehabilitative effort is at best a matter of secondary 
concern and that the juvenile court is performing a function 
in many respects similar to that of a court of justice. This 
surely suggests that the essence, if not the precise content, 
of the fair p,rocedures should also be respected in the juve-
nile court. 9 
It is true that some children who are in fact "guilty" es-
cape conviction by contesting the charges of juvenile delin-
quency against them and putting the state to its proof. (It 
is, of course, equally true that some children who are in 
fact "not guilty" escape conviction only because they have 
a lawyer who cqntests the charges.) It might even be argued 
that a system in which children are denied the right to legal 
representation would be preferable, since fewer guilty kids 
would "get off." The simple answer to these propositions is 
that the Constitution does not permit us to construct, or 
experiment with, schemes affecting individual liberty, no 
matter how noble our intentions, unless they are in accor-
dance with the legal and political principles which it man-
dates. And if some guilty individuals go free-or in Mr. 
Stapleton's terms, lose the opportunity for rehabilitative 
experiences-that is the price we pay for our constitutional 
system of government. 
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lt should be unnecessary to point out that procedural due 
process requirements are not mere legal "technicalities" 
designed to permit the guilty to escape judgment. Mr. 
Stapleton's statistics, however, create that impression by 
focusing upon a small group of children who were admit-
tedly guilty and the majority of whose cases were dis-
missed-apparently owing to the efforts of defense counsel, 
although that is not entirely clear.20 But what of those 
children whose cases were dismissed because they were 
innocent? And what of those who were convicted even 
though they were innocent, because the absence of counsel 
and procedural safeguards resulted in an unreliable fact-
finding process? It is simply not enough to say, as Mr. 
Stapleton does, that "[t] his is a matter that must be left to 
pure speculation .... "Mr. Stapleton, in fact, is subject to 
his own most damning criticism: the failure to use a control 
group for a comparison of effects. He doesn't give us com-
parable statistics for Gotham, the other city he studied, nor 
does he give us comparable statistics of a criminal court. In 
this light, his apparent alarm is unfounded and his conclu-
sions are fruitless. 
No lawyer will contest Stapleton's assertion that the pres-
ence of defense counsel in juvenile cases will result in a 
higher rate of dismissals and lenient dispositions and that a 
proportion of those children who get off will in fact be 
guilty. But the lawyer's function and duty is to defend a 
client who is threatened with the loss of liberty; the Canons 
of Ethics requires that a lawyer represent his client vigor-
ously and to the best of his ability. If a juvenile client does 
not desire the benefits of incarceration in a reform school, 
it is his lawyer's obligation to prevent that result if possible. 
A lawyer who fails to do that because he feels that his cli-
ent might benefit from a court-imposed treatment program 
is behaving unethically and is deserving of censure. The 
lawyer's client is the child, not the community or the sys-
tem or the public interest. The lawyer's role is to try to 
achieve the result which his client wishes, and not to play 
father, judge, probation officer or social worker. 21 That is 
the least he can do to give the accused juvenile parity with 
the criminal defendant. 
Stapleton is wrong in asserting that Gault creates a "role 
strain" for defense counsel in juvenile cases by requiring an 
attorney with a guilty client to be both lawyer and judge. 
The Supreme Court did not articulate a "less than classi-
cally adversarial role" for defense lawyers in juvenile cases. 
Of course, nothing in the Gault decision precludes defense 
counsel from suggesting and participating in informal dis-
positions in lieu of adjudication of delinquency, if his client 
agrees and particularly if an adjudication of delinquency is 
likely to occur despite the lawyer's best efforts.22 But this 
kind of activity is nearly identical to plea-bargaining and 
securing "youthful offender" treatment and sentencing on 
the part of counsel in a criminal case. Moreover, the Court 
did envision that after an adjudication of delinquency, a 
child's lawyer might play a role in the selection and imple-
mentation of an appropriate dispositional plan. And an 
effective lawyer will perform these roles as a matter of 
course. 
In short, Mr. Stapleton is correct in observing that re-
forms in the juvenile courts were necessary both before 
Gault and today. It is doubtful, however, that the approach 
of the social sciences was or should have been important in 
the Gault decision, or should be instrumental in reform 
today. As Allen has emphasized, 
"The Court ... is not simply a laboratory or a clinic and 
the tendency to conceive of it in these terms, largely to the 
exclusion of other functions it is called upon to perform, 
cont-ributes neither to a sound understanding of the institu-
tion nor to its proper use in serving the public interest."23 
I. 387 U.S. I (1967). 
2. Id. at 13. 
3. Id. at 19, n. 25. 
4. Id. at 20. 
5. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
6. Id. at 562. 
7. 387 U.S. I at 30-1. 
8. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
9. Id. at 359. 
10. 387 U.S. I at 28. 
11. Id. at 22. 
12. Id. at 24. 
13. Id. at 25. 
14. Id. at 27. 
I 5. Id. at 61 et seq. 
16. Id. at 74 et seq. 
17. American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics, 
Canon 5. As of January 1970, the Canons of Professional Ethics was 
replaced by the new Code of Professional Responsibility. Mr. Staple· 
ton doubts wh.et.her the old Canon 5 applies to juvenile cases-appar· 
ently because 11 ts entitled "The Defense and Prosecution of Those 
Acc~sed of Crime." But the new Canon 7 § 20 makes it clea'r the 
cnmmal defense lawyer and the juvenile defense lawyer have the 
same duty. It employs similar language to that of the old Canon 5 
and it comes under the heading "Duty of the Lawyer to the Adve;. 
sary System of Justice." 
_18. F. Allen, The Juvenile Court and the Limits of Juvenile Justice, 
m F. Allen, The Borderland of Criminal Justice 43 (1964). 
19. Id. at 5 5-6. 
20. Of the 13 such cases which were dismissed, the state chose not 
to prosecute in three, the complaining witness failed to appear in 
four, and the state was unable to prove its case in six. 
21. See J. Weiss, Defense of a Juvenile Court Case in Criminal De· 
fense Techniques 6·0 I at 6·05 - 6-06 (R. Cipes, ed., 1969). 
22. Of course, counsel should advise his client to make the neces-
sary_ admi~sions only if they will not be brought to the attention of 
th~ JU_dge m the event that the informal disposition fails and the 
child 1s subsequently brought to trial. 
23. F. Allen, supra at 61. 
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